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A B S T R A C T
Intergroup trust is vital for cooperation and societal well-being, but is harder to establish than interpersonal
trust. We investigate whether expressions of negative emotions, in particular regret, following economic deci-
sions can shape intergroup trust. In each of three studies participants were members of a group playing a two-
round trust game with another group. In the first round, they observed an outgroup member who acted fairly or
unfairly towards the ingroup and then expressed positive (i.e., happiness) or negative (i.e., regret, unhappiness)
emotions about this behavior. In the second round, participants played with another outgroup member.
Emotions displayed by the outgroup representative following unfair behavior in round 1 influenced participants'
allocations in round 2, which were higher following regret and unhappiness than following positive emotions.
Thus, emotions expressed by one outgroup member affected interactions with other members who had not
communicated emotions. Findings of Study 3 revealed that these effects were driven by regret increasing in-
tergroup trust, rather than by happiness decreasing it. Moreover, participants' allocations were predicted by their
perceptions of the extent to which the outgroup representative wished to change her behavior. Together, the
findings reveal that regret expressions influence intergroup trust by attenuating the detrimental effects of unfair
behavior.
1. Beyond actions: the social influence of emotions in intergroup
trust games
In everyday life people get married, shop online, pay their taxes,
support political parties, or buy Volkswagen cars. These seemingly
disparate activities have one thing in common: They depend on trust in
others, whether these others are individuals or organizations. Trust – an
acceptance of vulnerability based on the expectation that others can be
relied upon (Rotter, 1967) – is associated with wellbeing and a variety
of positive organizational outcomes (DeNeve & Cooper, 1998;
Rousseau, Sitkin, Burt, & Camerer, 1998). It operates on multiple levels
and sustains relationships between individuals, groups, organizations,
and countries (Hoffman, 2002; Rempel, Holmes, & Zanna, 1985). In the
current research, we focus on trust between groups, and more specifi-
cally on how expressions of emotion following breaches of trust mod-
erate the impact of such breaches.
A large body of evidence (e.g., Balliet & Van Lange, 2013) reveals
that relations between groups are more competitive and less trusting
than those between individuals, presumably reflecting the fact that
group members are generally motivated to positively differentiate their
own group from other groups (Tajfel, 1974; see also Hornsey, 2008).
This tendency is especially marked in situations involving conflicts of
interest (Sherif & Sherif, 1953), and where groups are represented by
individuals (Folmer, Wildschut, De Cremer, & Van Lange, 2017). Two
reasons for this are negative beliefs about the outgroup, and the shield
of anonymity that enables group members to pursue selfish interests
without taking responsibility for their actions. As a consequence,
groups are more likely than individuals to respond to cooperation by
defecting (Wildschut, Pinter, Vevea, Insko, & Schopler, 2003). Once
such a breach of trust occurs, it is hard to repair its effects: In the ab-
sence of a one-to-one relationship between two parties, acknowledging
responsibility and harm is problematic because some members of the
perpetrating group may not be involved, and not all members of the
victim group may be adversely affected. Therefore, reparative acts such
as apologies, which are generally effective in individual contexts
(Lount, Zhong, Sibanathan, & Murningan, 2008), are often received
with skepticism and distrust in intergroup settings (e.g., Kim, Cooper,
Dirks, & Ferrin, 2013; Nadler & Liviatan, 2006).
In the current research, we investigate the extent to which co-
operation can be restored following a breach of trust in an intergroup
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setting. Specifically, we study whether expressions of regret can mod-
erate the impact of transgressions on subsequent trusting behavior.
Prior research shows that people's decisions to trust and act fairly are
shaped by their own and others' emotions (e.g., De Melo, Carnevale,
Read, & Gratch, 2014; Dunning, Fetchenhauer, & Schlösser, 2012; Van
der Schalk, Kuppens, Bruder, & Manstead, 2015). Emotional expres-
sions serve as cues to trustworthiness and cooperation (e.g., Krumhuber
et al., 2007) and communicate how people feel about specific beha-
viors, thereby shaping observers' appraisals of the same events
(Manstead & Fischer, 2001). For example, joy expressed after engaging
in uncooperative behavior – such as sharing only a small proportion of
monetary resources with another person – can be read as implying that
selfishness is conducive to the expresser's goals. Observers are likely to
infer that this person may behave similarly in the future and, as a
consequence, decide not to cooperate with him or her. Regret is likely
to be particularly relevant to restoring trust. This emotion arises from
the appraisal that the outcome of a decision is worse than it would have
been had we decided differently (Martinez, Zeelenberg, & Rijsman,
2011; Zeelenberg & Pieters, 2007). Regret is associated with feelings of
personal responsibility for these decisions, and with a focus on undoing
it or repairing the mistake (Zeelenberg, van Dijk, Manstead, & van der
Pligt, 2000). People experiencing regret want to have the opportunity
to change their behavior (Roseman, Wiest, & Swartz, 1994).
As a consequence, regret displays following unfair behavior in
mixed-motive situations could convey the impression that someone is
upset by the transgression and motivated to make amends – similar to
other appeasement emotions such as guilt or embarrassment
(Baumeister, Stillwell, & Heatherton, 1994; Feinberg, Willer, & Keltner,
2012; Lelieveld, Van Dijk, Van Beest, & Van Kleef, 2013; Semin &
Manstead, 1982; Van Kleef, de Dreu, & Manstead, 2006). In other
words, appeasement emotions – such as regret – should facilitate re-
medial efforts that serve the long-term goal of building reliable, non-
exploitative exchange relationships based on mutual trust (Schniter &
Sheremeta, 2014; Schniter, Sheremeta, & Shields, 2015). By contrast,
expressions of positive emotions, such as happiness or pride, should
signal that the transgression was conducive to the expresser's goals and
is therefore likely to recur.
Consistent with these predictions, two studies (De Melo et al., 2014;
Van der Schalk et al., 2015) demonstrated that people's decisions are
influenced by regret and positive expressions about fair/cooperative or
unfair/uncooperative behaviors. Participants in these studies observed
others or interacted with them while playing an economic game. Regret
following unfair or uncooperative behavior was perceived as a signal
that fair or cooperative behavior was congruent with the expresser's
goals, whereas positive emotions following these behaviors were per-
ceived as signals that unfair or uncooperative behavior was congruent
with the expresser's goals (De Melo et al., 2014). As a result, partici-
pants were more cooperative or more likely to make fair decisions after
exposure to individuals who expressed regret, as opposed to joy, fol-
lowing competitive or unfair decisions in the economic game. The re-
verse was found for regret and joy following fair or cooperative beha-
vior.
These results show that regret influences decisions to be fair or to
cooperate in interpersonal contexts, which raises the question of whe-
ther this emotion also has the potential to repair relations between
groups. The research of Van der Schalk et al. (2015, Studies 1A and 1B)
is especially relevant here: While playing an ultimatum game, partici-
pants were influenced by the regret expressed by another player con-
cerning his/her fair behavior in a previous round, as this decreased the
likelihood of participants making a fair offer to another player in a
subsequent round. Importantly, because the exemplar shared resources
with another individual, participants' own outcomes were not affected
by the exemplar's prior behavior. Thus, merely observing that the ex-
emplar felt regret about acting fairly decreased participants' own de-
cisions to be fair, possibly because displays of regret communicated that
being fair led to undesirable outcomes. Also relevant is a study by Ten
Brinke and Adams (2015), who found that sadness displayed by com-
pany representatives during public apologies significantly predicted the
effectiveness of these apologies. Expressions of sadness predicted fa-
vorable outcomes for the company, such as higher stock market returns,
more positive perceptions of the company, and greater willingness to
invest in it. Thus emotions expressed by a group representative in a
potentially distrustful and competitive setting (Folmer et al., 2017) can
influence attitudes and behaviors towards the organization as a whole.
In the current research, we build on these findings by examining
whether expressions of negative emotion moderate the impact of fair or
unfair intergroup behaviors on subsequent trusting behavior.
Specifically, we test how regret expressed by an outgroup member in
relation to his or her behavior towards an ingroup member in one round
of an economic game influence participants' future interaction with an
outgroup member in a second round of the game. In Study 1 we com-
pared the effects of regret and happiness using video recordings of fa-
cial expressions. Study 2 was a conceptual replication of Study 1, in
which we examined whether the effects observed in Study 1 extend to
general expressions of unhappiness and happiness, rather than being
specific to regret. To examine whether emotional expressions influence
reactions to both positive and negative intergroup behavior, we in-
cluded both fair and unfair behavior in Studies 1 and 2. In Study 3 we
compared the influence of regret and happiness to a control neutral
condition while also measuring regret-related appraisals. Based on
previous research, we hypothesized that expressions of regret (and
unhappiness) following unfair behavior would encourage greater trust
than would expressions of happiness. Conversely, we expected that
regret and unhappiness following fair behavior would decrease trust.
All studies were approved by the ethics committee of Cardiff
University's School of Psychology (EC.14.10.14.3866). The three ex-
periments used a version of the trust game (adapted from Berg,
Dickhaut, & McCabe, 1995), a classic measure of behavioral trust. In
this paradigm, two players receive the same amount of a resource. One
player (hereafter ‘trustor’) is then asked to decide how much of the
resource s/he wants to send to the other player (hereafter ‘trustee’). Any
resource sent to the trustee is tripled. The trustee then has the oppor-
tunity to return any proportion of his/her resources to the trustor.
Sending more resources is risky for the trustor because the trustee could
choose to return little or none of the resources. However, sending more
resources offers a way to increase resources for both parties, provided
the trust is reciprocated.
2. Study 1
We used an immersive paradigm in which participants belonged to a
group (the ingroup team) that ostensibly played two rounds of the trust
game with an outgroup team to gain lottery tickets. The outcome of the
two rounds contributed to each group's pooled resources. In each ses-
sion, a confederate posing as fellow ingroup member was chosen –
apparently randomly – to represent the participant's group in the first
round of the game. She played with an outgroup representative, see-
mingly also selected at random, and always made a trusting move at the
beginning of the round. The first round of the game included the ex-
perimental manipulations. The behavior of the outgroup representative
was ‘fair,’ such that parity of resources between the groups was re-
stored, or ‘unfair,’ such that the outgroup had more resources than the
ingroup. We also manipulated the emotions expressed by the outgroup
member, by varying the facial expressions she displayed following the
behavior: She either smiled or showed a negative expression intended
to convey regret (see Fig. 1 and Supplemental Materials, S1). In the
second round, participants played with an anonymous outgroup
member. The number of tickets they sent to this person, together with
their expectations of what members of the other team would share,
served as the primary dependent measures.
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2.1. Method
2.1.1. Design and participants
Below we report all measures, manipulations, and exclusions. The
study had a 2 (Behavior: fair vs. unfair)× 2 (Emotion: happiness vs.
regret) between-subjects design. We recruited as many participants as
we could during a 2-week period, aiming for 30 usable data points in
each condition. Participants were undergraduate psychology students
(N=147, 131 females; Mage= 18.58 years, SD=1.44) compensated
with course credit and recruited in groups of two or three persons, for a
total of 53 experimental sessions. We discarded data from 18 subjects
(15 females) from further analyses: twelve who did not answer three
screening questions correctly, three who recognized one of the in-
dividuals in the video, and three who during debriefing showed that
they were aware of the purpose of the study. The final sample com-
prised 129 participants and 52 groups (13 groups per condition, with
between 30 and 35 participants in each condition; see Supplemental
Materials, Table S2). With this number of participants, we achieved
80% statistical power (α= 0.05) to detect a medium-sized interaction
effect (f=0.25) in a between-subjects ANOVA.
2.1.2. Procedure
Each group included a female confederate who posed as a fellow-
student enrolled in the study and who was blind to the experimental
condition. The same confederate served for all groups. Groups therefore
consisted of three or four members, including the confederate. We
randomly allocated each team to one of the four experimental condi-
tions (fully crossing fair vs. unfair behavior with happiness vs. regret).
First, subjects were informed that they were participating with another
group of students recruited for the same study, who would be working
in another room in the same building. The two groups had ostensibly
been formed on the basis of scores on a prior mass survey that had been
completed by all students at the start of the academic year. The ex-
perimenter explained that it was necessary for the two groups to start
the different steps of the experiment at exactly the same time, and
appeared to communicate by telephone with a colleague supervising
the other group before each step.
After providing written consent, participants were given 10min to
agree on a name for their group. This task was intended to create group
cohesion. Next, the experimenter explained that the two groups would
be playing a computer game to gain lottery tickets, and that all study
participants would play on behalf of their respective teams. The goal
was to maximize the group's tickets and thereby its chances of winning
the lottery prize of £100. In reality, all groups had an equal chance of
winning. In order to learn the rules of the game, participants first
played a ‘demonstration round.’ They gathered around a PC computer
(screen size: 14″, display resolution: 1280× 800), equipped with a
webcam and were informed that the two groups would be able to see
and hear each other at certain points during the demonstration. Then,
the experimenter ostensibly tested the video connection between the
two rooms by opening videoconferencing software (join.me 2015,
LogMeIn, Inc.) such that participants could briefly see themselves on
screen. An automated voice message announced ‘the conference will
begin when the next party joins,’ followed by a beep supposedly sig-
naling that the other team started the video connection. The experi-
menter then launched the game program, implemented in MediaLab
(version 2012.4.133, Empirisoft Corporation) and using the trust game
adapted from Berg et al. (1995). First, the computer asked for the name
of the team and its members and selected (apparently at random) the
confederate to play this first round. She was asked to sit in front of the
computer and to make sure that the other group members were able to
read the screen, after which the experimenter left the room.
The program then revealed the name of the other team and its re-
presentative, delivered the instructions for the trust game, and played a
full-screen video ostensibly showing the outgroup greeting the partici-
pants. In reality, the video was previously recorded with a webcam
(Microsoft Lifecam HD-3000; size: 1920× 1080, frame rate: 29 frames/
s). It showed a female student sitting in front of a computer with three
other persons standing behind her, in a setting closely resembling the
one in which groups of participants were located.
Instructions explained that the confederate's task was to send to the
other group a proportion of the 10-lottery-ticket endowment that each
group had received at the start of the round. When asked to decide how
many tickets she would like to pass to the other team, the confederate
always sent 7 tickets, announcing her decision without explicitly con-
sulting other ingroup members. Next, subjects were informed that the
outgroup representative would discuss her decision with other mem-
bers of her team. They saw a full-screen video of the representative
turning towards her group, and then learned that the other group had
decided to return either 14 tickets (for a final outcome of 17–17; fair
condition) or no tickets (3–31; unfair condition). The information about
the outgroup response was followed by the emotion manipulation.
Participants viewed a full-screen video recording of the outgroup re-
presentative displaying a facial expression of regret or happiness. The
former involved lip pressing and downward head movements, as in
expressions of embarrassment or shame (Keltner, 1995). These re-
cordings were validated in a pilot study (see Supplemental Materials, S1
for a detailed description and https://osf.io/h7av3/?view_only=
64a45a1b7def4d95b1231e35df6a2c78 for the video files). Fig. 1
shows still images from the two videos.
Group members then moved to another room to play the second
round with an anonymous outgroup member.1 Each person sat at a
Fig. 1. Stimuli used in Study 1: regret and happiness of the outgroup representative were presented in video recordings.
1 In Studies 1 and 2 this outgroup member could, in theory, have been the
outgroup representative who played the first round of the game. However, this
possibility was ruled out in Study 3, where participants were specifically in-
formed that the round 2 game partner was not the representative from round 1.
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separate computer station. The program apparently ‘matched’ them
with a member of the other team, referred to as the ‘game partner.’
Instructions explained that, as in the demonstration round, each player
started the game with a 10-lottery-ticket endowment. After a brief re-
minder of the rules of the trust game, participants were asked to decide
how many of their 10 tickets they wanted to pass to their game partner
and to report the number of tickets they thought a typical outgroup
member would share if he or she was the trustor. The next two items
asked how much participants thought they had in common with in-
group and outgroup members. As manipulation checks, they also rated
the fairness of the outgroup's behavior in round 1, and how positive,
happy, and regretful the outgroup representative had felt about it.
Participants responded to these items using 5-point scales with end-
points labeled: very negative and very positive, not at all and extremely,
and none at all and a great deal, respectively. Finally, three screening
questions tested participants' understanding of the trust game (see
https://osf.io/h7av3/?view_only=
64a45a1b7def4d95b1231e35df6a2c78 for the full questionnaire). The
outcome of round 2 was then revealed: The game partner always re-
turned twice the amount sent by the participant, such that the two
players ended the game with the same number of tickets.
After completing the procedure, participants were thanked and
asked not to share the details of the study with others. They received a
debriefing e-mail at the end of data collection and we randomly se-
lected one winning team to share the lottery prize of £100 between its
members.
2.2. Results
2.2.1. Manipulation checks
Participants felt they had more in common with ingroup members
(M=3.26, SD=0.87) than with outgroup members (M=2.67,
SD=0.88), t(128)= 6.32, p < .001, d=0.66 (see Supplemental
Materials, S2, for all descriptive statistics). Consistent with the findings
of a pilot study (see Supplemental Materials, S1), the outgroup's deci-
sion to return 0 tickets was rated as less fair (M=1.77, SD=1.06) than
its decision to return 14 tickets (M=4.72, SD=0.52), F(1,
125)= 411.12, p < .001, ηp2= 0.77.2
Participants in the regret condition perceived the group re-
presentative as more regretful (M=2.41, SD=0.80 vs. M=1.78,
SD=0.81, F(1, 125)= 19.30, p < .001, ηp2= 0.13), less happy
(M=3.11, SD=0.95 vs. M=3.94, SD=0.84, F(1, 125)= 26.95,
p < .001, ηp2= 0.18), and less positive (M=2.84, SD=0.91 vs.
M=4.13, SD=0.71, F(1, 125)= 81.29, p < .001, ηp2= 0.39) than
did participants in the happy condition.3
2.2.2. Allocations
In round 2 of the game, participants indicated how many of their 10
lottery tickets they wished to send to an anonymous member of the
other team. These allocations (see Fig. 2) were entered into an ANOVA
where the factors were outgroup Behavior (fair vs. unfair) and outgroup
Emotion (happiness vs. regret). There was a main effect of Behavior:
Participants sent more tickets to fair (M=6.16, SD=1.62) than to
unfair outgroups (M=3.29, SD=2.04), F(1, 125)= 77.36, p < .001,
ηp2= 0.38. The main effect of outgroup Emotion was not significant, F
(1, 125)= 2.20, p= .14, ηp2= 0.02. A marginally significant interac-
tion, F(1, 125)= 3.39, p= .07, ηp2= 0.03, revealed that in the unfair
condition expressions of regret led to higher allocations (M=3.87,
SD=2.10) than did smiles (M=2.80, SD=1.88), F(1, 125)= 5.56,
p= .02, ηp2= 0.04, 95% CI [0.17,1.96]. The corresponding difference
within the fair condition was not significant, F(1, 125)= 0.06, p= .80,
ηp2 < 0.01, 95% CI [−0.78,1.01].
2.2.3. Expected outgroup allocations
Participants' trust in the other team was also indexed by their ex-
pectations of the number of tickets (0−10) that a typical outgroup
member would send. This measure of trust was influenced by outgroup
Behavior, F(1, 125)= 88.27, p < .001, ηp2= 0.41: Participants ex-
pected that typical members of fair outgroups would send more tickets
(M=5.77, SD=1.85) than typical members of unfair outgroups
(M=2.60, SD=1.95). The main effect of Emotion was not significant,
F(1, 125)= 0.58, p= .45, ηp2 < 0.01. However, the interaction was
marginally significant, F(1, 125)= 3.39, p= .07, ηp2= 0.03:
Participants tended to expect fewer tickets from the outgroup when
unfair decisions had been accompanied by happiness (M=2.20,
SD=1.91) rather than regret (M=3.07, SD=1.93), F(1, 125)= 3.41,
p= .07, ηp2= 0.03, 95% CI [−1.80, 0.06]. Participants' expectations
did not differ as a function of emotion within the fair condition, F(1,
125)= 0.58, p= .45, ηp2 < 0.01, 95% CI [−0.57, 1.29].
Insight into the process underlying the effect of outgroup emotion
on participants' allocations and their expectations of the outgroup be-
havior within the unfair behavior condition can be gained by examining
the correlations between the key dependent variables, which are shown
in Table 1 (below the diagonal).4 It can be seen that there was a strong
Fig. 2. Allocations in round 2 of the trust game as a function of the experi-
mental condition. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. The asterisk
indicates significance at p < .05 (Study 1).
2 Ratings of fairness were not affected by emotion of the outgroup re-
presentative, F(1, 125)=0.12, p= .73, ηp2 < 0.01, but Emotion interacted
with Behavior, F(1, 125)= 6.91, p= .01, ηp2= 0.05, such that, following un-
fair behavior, regret elicited higher ratings of fairness (M=2.00, SD=1.14)
than did the happy facial expression (M=1.57, SD=0.95), F(1, 125)=4.42,
p= .04, ηp2= 0.03, 95% CI [0.02,0.83]. The difference between emotions
displayed following fair behavior was not significant, F(1, 125)= 2.60, p= .11,
ηp2= 0.02, 95% CI [−0.07,0.74].
3 The main effects of Behavior and the interactions between Emotion and
Behavior were all non-significant, F(1, 125)= 0.01, p= .92, ηp2 < 0.001 and
F(1, 125)=0.24, p= .62, ηp2 < 0.01 (happy), F(1, 125) < 0.01, p= .99,
ηp2 < 0.001 and F(1, 125)=1.94, p= .17, ηp2= 0.01 (positive), F(1,
125)=0.31, p= .58, ηp2 < 0.01 and F(1, 125) < 0.01, p= .97, ηp2 < 0.001
(regretful).
4 Additional analyses conducted on participants' allocations in the unfair
condition revealed that the effects of emotion on allocations were mediated by
participants' ratings of happiness and regret of the outgroup representative.
Specifically, ratings of the representative's happiness were a significant pre-
dictor of allocations in a joint regression model controlling for emotion con-
dition, B=−0.70, F(2,62)= 8.08, p= .01, 95% CI [−1.18, −0.21] (with a
significant indirect effect estimated with 5000 bootstrap resamples, B=0.63,
95% CI [0.28, 1.13]). The same was true for ratings of the representative's
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positive association between allocations and expectations of outgroup
behavior, and also that both trust measures were positively associated
with ratings of the outgroup representative's regret, but negatively as-
sociated with ratings of her positivity and happiness. The corresponding
correlations were non-significant in the fair condition (shown in Table 1
above the diagonal).
2.3. Discussion
In Study 1 we investigated whether facial expressions of regret
displayed by an outgroup representative affected participants' trust in
subsequent interactions with other members of the same group. This
was indeed the case: Participants' allocations and expectations of out-
group behavior were both affected by the emotions expressed by the
group representative. Specifically, regret following unfair behavior
significantly enhanced intergroup trust, compared to expressions of
happiness by the outgroup representative following such behavior. Not
only were participants willing to send more tickets to outgroup mem-
bers in the regret condition; they also expected the outgroup to invest
more lottery tickets. Although regret affected trust following unfair
outgroup behavior, it did not do so when the other team acted fairly. In
Study 2, we examined the boundary conditions of the effects of regret
and happiness observed in Study 1 by investigating whether they would
also be found when more general positive and negative feelings are
expressed. We used a modified procedure, in which outgroup reactions
to unfairness were communicated by written responses to emotion
scales, ostensibly completed by the other team, conveying either posi-
tive or negative affect about the group-serving decision.
3. Study 2
The procedure for this study was similar to the one used in Study 1:
Groups of participants including a confederate ostensibly played a trust
game with another team. This time, however, participants did not see
this other team or the facial expressions of the outgroup representative.
Instead, positive and negative emotions were communicated via ques-
tionnaires ostensibly completed by the other team, showing that they
felt happy or unhappy about their decision. As in Study 1, we measured
participants' allocations and expectations of outgroup behavior during
the second round of the trust game, when they played with an anon-
ymous member of the other team. Based on the findings of Study 1, we
predicted that – relative to the positive condition – negative emotion
communicated by the other team following unfair behavior would
improve intergroup trust, which would lead participants to send more
tickets and expect higher outgroup returns in the second round.
3.1. Method
3.1.1. Design and participants
This study had a 2 (outgroup Behavior: fair vs. unfair)×2 (outgroup
Emotion: positive vs. negative) between-subjects design. We recruited as
many participants as possible during a 3-week period, again aiming for
30 data points per condition. Participants (N=172, 152 females,
Mage= 20.05 years, SD=2.73) were recruited in groups of two or three
and were compensated with course credit. Due to a technical problem,
the responses of four female subjects were not recorded by the experi-
mental software. We also discarded data from 11 participants (all female)
from further analyses: ten who did not answer the three screening
questions correctly and one whose responses to debriefing questions
showed that she was aware of the purpose of the study. The final sample
comprised 157 participants (with between 37 and 41 participants in each
condition; see Supplemental Materials, Table S3) and 60 teams (15 per
condition). With this number of participants, we achieved 80% statistical
power (α=0.05) to detect a medium-sized interaction effect (f=0.22)
in a between-subjects ANOVA.
3.1.2. Procedure
As in Study 1, the teams included a confederate blind to experi-
mental condition. Subjects observed her playing the demonstration
round with the representative of the other team, and then played a
second round of the trust game with an anonymous outgroup member.
However, because videos were not used in Study 2, there was no need
for the experimenter to appear to test the video connection, or for
conferencing software to be used. Instead, participants were introduced
to the other team and informed about their decisions via the trust game
program. As in Study 1, the confederate always sent 7 tickets out of 10,
and participants then learned about the fair or unfair behavior of the
other team. The confederate was then presented with two questions
from the 9-point portrait version of the Self-Assessment Manikin (SAM)
scale (Bradley & Lang, 1994; The PXLab Self-Assessment Manikin
Scales, 2008) which asked her to rate how happy vs. unhappy and how
calm vs. aroused the team members felt about their decision. Partici-
pants and the confederate were then informed that their group had
been selected by the computer to see how the other team had responded
to these questions. They were also told that the outgroup would not see
ingroup members' responses or know that the ingroup was able to see
the outgroup's responses. Subjects then viewed screenshots of the SAM
scale ostensibly completed by the other team. In the positive condition,
the ‘happiest’ pictogram on a 9-point portrait version of the SAM scale
was selected; in the negative condition the ‘unhappiest’ pictogram was
selected. The same arousal ratings (6 on a 9-point scale) were shown in
both conditions.
Table 1
Correlations between allocations, expectations of outgroup behavior, identification, and emotion ratings (Study 1). Cells above the diagonal represent the fair
conditions and cells below the diagonal represent the unfair conditions.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1. Allocations – 0.55⁎⁎ 0.30⁎ 0.29⁎ 0.07 −0.10 −0.21 −0.09
2. Expectations of outgroup behavior 0.55⁎⁎⁎ – 0.08 0.13 0.03 0.09 −0.22 0.10
3. Identification with ingroup −0.01 −0.01 – 0.40⁎⁎ 0.04 −0.06 0.02 −0.04
4. Identification with outgroup 0.12 0.26⁎ 0.25⁎ – 0.04 0.13 −0.07 < 0.001
5. Fairness 0.16 0.27⁎ −0.13 0.35⁎⁎ – 0.23 −0.11 0.22
6. Happiness −0.41⁎⁎ −0.15 0.01 −0.20 −0.05 – −0.67⁎⁎⁎ 0.73⁎⁎⁎
7. Regret 0.35⁎⁎ 0.49⁎⁎⁎ −0.04 0.08 −0.04 −0.54⁎⁎⁎ – −0.64⁎⁎⁎
8. Positivity −0.32⁎⁎ −0.38⁎⁎ 0.03 −0.26⁎ −0.09 0.70⁎⁎⁎ −0.65⁎⁎⁎ –
Note. Correlations in bold are significant, with ⁎ denoting p < .05, ⁎⁎ denoting p < .01, and ⁎⁎⁎ denoting p < .001.
(footnote continued)
regret, B=0.64, F(2,62)= 5.52, p= .02, 95% CI [0.09, 1.18] (indirect effect:
B=0.40, 95% CI [0.10, 0.91]). In both cases emotion condition was no longer
a significant predictor of allocation, (B=0.44, F(2,62)= 0.71, p= .40, 95% CI
[−0.59, 1.47], happy, and B=0.67, F(2,62)= 1.75, p= .19, 95% CI [−0.34,
1.68], regret), consistent with complete mediation. Ratings of positivity did not
significantly affect allocations in round 2 when controlling for emotion condi-
tion, F(2,62)= 2.61, p= .11, 95% CI [−1.10,0.12] (indirect effect: B=0.73,
95% CI [−0.08, 1.66]).
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Measures collected in round 2 were similar to those included in
Study 1. This time, we asked about participants' expectations con-
cerning the number of tickets they thought their game partner (and not,
as in Study 1, a typical outgroup member) would share as the trustor in
the game (see https://osf.io/h7av3/?view_only=64a45a1b7def4
d95b1231e35df6a2c78 for the full questionnaire).5
3.2. Results
3.2.1. Manipulation checks
Participants reported having more in common with ingroup mem-
bers (M=3.42, SD=0.82) than with outgroup members (M=2.79,
SD=0.82), t(156)= 8.38, p < .001, d=0.76. They also rated the
behavior of the other team as less fair when the outgroup returned 0
tickets (M=1.70, SD=0.97) compared to 14 tickets (M=4.61,
SD=0.54), F(1, 153)= 552.07, p < .001, ηp2= 0.78 (see
Supplemental Materials, S3, for all descriptive statistics).6
As expected, participants in the negative emotion condition thought
that the trustee and her team felt more unhappy (M=3.06, SD=1.22
vs. M=1.92, SD=0.97, F(1, 153)= 43.09, p < .001, ηp2= 0.22),
less happy (M=2.26, SD=1.14 vs. M=4.30, SD=0.81, F(1,
153)= 180.90, p < .001, ηp2= 0.54), and less positive (M=2.39,
SD=0.91 vs. M=4.17, SD=0.85, F(1, 153)= 181.55, p < .001,
ηp2= 0.54) than did participants in the positive emotion condition.7
3.2.2. Allocations
The number of tickets that participants sent to the game partners in
round 2 was affected by outgroup Behavior (see Fig. 3): Participants
sent more tickets to the fair (M=5.95, SD=1.99) than to the unfair
outgroup (M=3.95, SD=2.10), F(1, 153)= 37.72, p < .001,
ηp2= 0.20. Neither the main effect of Emotion nor the interaction be-
tween Emotion and Behavior were significant, F(1, 153)= 1.48,
p= .22, ηp2= 0.01 and F(1, 153)= 1.46, p= .23, ηp2= 0.01, respec-
tively. However, a comparison between the happiness and unhappiness
emotion conditions within unfair behavior revealed a marginally sig-
nificant difference, such that participants tended to allocate more
tickets when the outgroup reported feeling unhappiness (M=4.34,
SD=1.97) rather than happiness (M=3.55, SD=2.17), F(1,
153)= 3.05, p= .08, ηp2= 0.02, 95% CI [−1.69,0.10]. The difference
between the two fair conditions was not significant, F(1, 153) < 0.001,
p= .99, ηp2 < 0.001, 95% CI [−0.93,0.92].8
3.2.3. Expected outgroup allocations
Expectations of outgroup allocations were influenced by outgroup
Behavior: Participants thought that members of fair teams would send
more tickets (M=5.63, SD=1.35) than members of unfair teams
(M=2.91, SD=1.95), F(1, 153)= 102.12, p < .001, ηp2= 0.40.
However, neither the main effect of Emotion nor the Behavior by
Emotion interaction were significant, F(1, 153) < 0.01, p= .95,
ηp2 < 0.01, F(1, 153)= 2.64, p= .11, ηp2= 0.02, and a planned
comparison within the unfair condition revealed no significant effect of
emotion, F(1, 153)= 1.26, p= .26, ηp2 < 0.01, 95% CI [−1.16,0.32].
Correlations between the key dependent variables the fair and un-
fair Behavior conditions are shown in Table 2. As well as the strong and
significant relation between allocations and expectations of outgroup
behavior, it is worth noting that, as in Study 1, allocations in the unfair
condition were negatively correlated with ratings of the outgroup re-
presentative's happiness and positivity.
3.3. Discussion
In a conceptual replication of Study 1, we tested whether expressed
emotions moderated the effects of unfair behavior on intergroup trust.
An important difference with Study 1 was the way in which outgroup
emotions were operationalized; here they were conveyed by the pic-
tograms of the Self-Assessment Manikin scales, rather than by record-
ings of dynamic facial expressions. The results showed that negative
emotions tended to influence allocations in a manner consistent with
the findings of Study 1: Unhappiness following unfair behavior tended
to increase allocations, when compared to happiness. Both experiments
reveal that, in the context of an intergroup trust game, breaches of trust
can be mitigated by expressions of negative non-confrontational
Fig. 3. Allocations in the second round of the trust game as a function of the
experimental condition. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.
†= p < .10 (Study 2).
5 Participants also completed the ‘slider’ measure of Social Value Orientation
(Murphy, Ackermann, & Handgraaf, 2011). This measure was included for
exploratory purposes and will not be discussed further.
6 Ratings of fairness were also affected by the emotion of the outgroup re-
presentative, F(1, 153)= 8.79, p= .004, ηp2= 0.05, and were lower when the
representative expressed negative (M=2.94, SD=1.62) than positive emo-
tion, (M=3.29, SD=1.68). Emotion did not interact with Behavior, F(1,
153)=0.33, p= .57, ηp2 < 0.01.
7 All three ratings were also affected by outgroup Behavior, with higher rat-
ings of happiness and positivity, and lower ratings of unhappiness in the unfair
conditions, F(1, 153)= 15.12, p < .001, ηp2= 0.09, F(1, 153)= 16.57,
p < .001, ηp2= 0.10, and F(1, 153)=7.26, p < .01, ηp2= 0.04, respectively.
Ratings of positivity were qualified by a marginally significant interaction be-
tween Behavior and Emotion, F(1, 153)= 4.04, p= .05, ηp2= 0.03, such that
the difference between the positive and negative emotion condition was larger
following fair, compared to unfair, behavior, F(1, 153)=116.16, p < .001,
ηp2= 0.43 vs. F(1, 153)= 67.88, p < .001, ηp2= 0.31, respectively. Neither
of the other two interaction effects was significant, F(1, 153)= 2.16, p= .14,
ηp2= 0.01 (happiness) and F(1, 153)= 0.40, p= .53, ηp2 < 0.01 (unhappi-
ness).
8 The nested nature of the data in Study 1 and 2, where participants were
nested within groups, suggests that multilevel models would be a more ap-
propriate statistical technique. We did not perform this analysis given the small
number of level-2 units (groups) combined with a small number of level-1 ob-
servations per group, which is lower than the minimum recommended for
(footnote continued)
multilevel analysis (Bell, Morgan, Kromrey, & Ferron, 2010; Maas & Hox,
2005). Instead, we conducted an additional analysis combining the data from
Studies 1 and 2, and using groups (rather than individual observations) as the
unit of analysis. This analysis is now reported in the Supplemental Materials,
S5. The results are consistent with the conclusions drawn from the separate
analyses of Studies 1 and 2, with a marginally significant interaction between
Emotion and Behavior, F(1, 108)=3.26, p= .07, ηp2= 0.03, and a significant
difference between allocations made in the regret/unhappiness condition
(M=4.18, SD=1.48) and those made in the happiness condition (M=3.23,
SD=1.67), F(1, 108)=6.60, p= .01, ηp2= 0.06, 95% CI [0.22, 1.69].
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emotions. They also suggest that the influence of emotion observed in
one-to-one interactions (De Melo et al., 2014) extends to intergroup
settings, such that emotions expressed by one member of an outgroup
influence future interactions with other outgroup members.
However, the effect of emotions in Study 2 was limited to the
measure of behavioral trust, and was weaker than the one observed in
Study 1. This difference is also reflected in the relation between trust
and ratings of emotions of the outgroup representative: The correlations
between allocations and emotion ratings were weaker in Study 2 than
in Study 1. Such discrepancies between the two studies suggest that the
expression of regret in Study 1 conveyed appeasement and readiness to
change the group's behavior more effectively than did the unhappy
pictograms used in Study 2, which communicated general negative
valence. This highlights the difference between regret and general ne-
gative affect, which can convey different messages, including de-
pendency and need for help (van Kleef et al., 2006). As a result, par-
ticipants may have varied in their interpretations of this expression of
diffuse negativity, leading to more ‘noisy’ responses. It is also worth
noting that in Study 2, subjects were told that the outgroup would not
know that the ingroup was able to see the outgroup's responses to the
SAM scales. As a result, the completed questionnaires could have been
interpreted as a less direct signal to the ingroup than the facial ex-
pressions used in Study 1, adding to the uncertainty about the com-
municated motives and emotions.
Similarly, the fact that stronger effects of emotion expressions were
observed in Study 1 suggests that dynamic facial displays of discrete
emotions have a bigger impact on participants' trust than do static
images of Self-Assessment Manikin scales. Our findings also lend sup-
port to arguments that bipolar affect scale instruments, such as the Self-
Assessment Manikin, may be insufficient to capture the more complex
emotional states experienced by people in social dilemmas (Schniter
et al., 2015). Finally, it is worth noting that the emotion manipulation
in Study 2 tended to affect allocations, but not expectations of outgroup
behavior. This suggests that, despite being highly correlated, these two
constructs are not identical and that participants' decisions to share
resources in the trust game may be more subject to affective influences
than are their estimates of how members of the other group would
behave (Fetchenhauer & Dunning, 2012).
One limitation of Studies 1 and 2 is that in the absence of a neutral
control condition we are unable to conclude whether the observed ef-
fects of emotion following breaches of trust are due to displays of regret
(or negative emotion) enhancing intergroup trust or to displays of
happiness (or positive emotion) reducing intergroup trust. Moreover,
we lack strong evidence for the interpretation that the increase in trust
following the facial expressions of regret was due to the regret-related
expectation that the outgroup was likely to change its behavior in the
future. Another potential limitation relates to the measurement of al-
locations to the outgroup. In round 2, participants were told that they
would play with an anonymous outgroup member, leaving open the
theoretical possibility that this could be the same outgroup re-
presentative who had been observed in the first round. It is therefore
possible that the findings of Studies 1 and 2 partly reflect the influence
of emotion at the interpersonal, rather than intergroup, level. We aimed
to address these limitations in Study 3, where emotions were (as in
Study 1) manipulated by means of dynamic video recordings of an
outgroup representative's facial expressions.
Given that regret did not affect participants' trust in the fair beha-
vior conditions of Studies 1 and 2, Study 3 focused on the effects of
regret following unfairness. To distinguish the effects of regret from
those of happiness, we included a neutral expression condition.
Moreover, in round 2 we asked participants to share resources with an
outgroup member who was explicitly said to be someone other than the
outgroup representative observed in the first round. Finally, to shed
more light on the presumed mechanism underlying the findings of
Studies 1 and 2, we specifically assessed the extent to which the facial
expressions of the outgroup representative conveyed her willingness to
change the allocation decision if she had the chance. This appraisal has
been linked with regret (e.g., Martinez et al., 2011) and provides in-
formation about the expresser's likely future behaviors.
4. Study 3
Like Study 1, Study 3 used video recordings of facial expressions, this
time portrayed by an experienced female actor. In a within-subjects de-
sign, participants saw the outgroup representative's happy, regretful, and
neutral facial expressions, ostensibly showing how she and her group felt
about the outcome of the round. After seeing each expression, subjects
were asked to imagine that they were to play a second round of the same
game with another member of the outgroup team. They then indicated the
number of lottery tickets that they would send to this other person, and
their expectations of howmany tickets the person would return. Consistent
with the findings of Studies 1 and 2, we hypothesized that participants
would send more lottery tickets to the other outgroup member and would
expect this person to return more when the outgroup representative was
regretful, rather than happy or neutral, about her unfair decision. We also
predicted that participants' perceptions of the outgroup representative's
willingness to change her decision would be higher following expressions
of regret than following happy or neutral expressions.
4.1. Method
4.1.1. Design and participants
This study had a 3-condition (Emotion: happiness, neutral, regret)
within-subjects design.9 Participants were recruited via Pureprofile, an
Table 2
Correlations between allocations, expectations of outgroup behavior, identification, and emotion ratings (Study 2). Cells above the diagonal represent the fair
conditions and cells below the diagonal represent the unfair conditions.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1. Allocations – 0.51⁎⁎⁎ −0.17 0.19 −0.04 −0.01 −0.04 0.05
2. Expectations of outgroup behavior 0.65⁎⁎⁎ – 0.06 0.06 −0.13 0.14 −0.06 0.21
3. Identification with ingroup < 0.01 0.13 – 0.15 0.19 0.15 −0.09 0.09
4. Identification with outgroup 0.06 0.04 0.45⁎⁎⁎ – −0.01 0.12 0.08 0.08
5. Fairness −0.12 −0.09 −0.14 0.03 – 0.23* −0.36⁎⁎ 0.29⁎
6. Happiness −0.26⁎ −0.18 −0.08 −0.23⁎ 0.04 – −0.48⁎⁎⁎ 0.85⁎⁎⁎
7. Unhappiness 0.20 −0.05 0.02 −0.01 0.01 −0.54⁎⁎⁎ – −0.45⁎⁎⁎
8. Positivity −0.22⁎ −0.17 −0.21 −0.12 0.16 0.75⁎⁎⁎ −0.53⁎⁎⁎ –
Note. Correlations in bold are significant, with ⁎ denoting p < .05, ⁎⁎ denoting p < .01, and ⁎⁎⁎ denoting p < .001.
9 Participants also rated two other facial expressions, but because these ex-
pressions were not the focus of the present research, this will not be discussed
further. A further group of participants completed exactly the same task in an
interpersonal, rather than intergroup, setting. The interpersonal condition
yielded a similar pattern of results to the one found in the intergroup condition,
but again this was not the focus of the present research and will not be
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external survey organization, and we aimed to recruit a minimum of 40
subjects. Forty-two participants (23 females, Mage= 30.43 years,
SD=3.63) completed the study and were paid for their participation.
With this number of participants, we achieved 80% statistical power
(α= 0.05) to detect a medium-sized interaction effect (f=0.25) in a
within-subjects ANOVA.
4.1.2. Procedure
This was an on-line experiment using Qualtrics (version 1.869s,
Provo, UT) to display the stimuli and collect responses. After providing
consent, participants were asked to adopt the role of being a member of
a 3-person group, and to imagine that they would be playing a game
with another person who was a member of a different 3-person team.
The two teams would be playing to gain lottery tickets. Next, partici-
pants read the instructions of the trust game, identical to the instruc-
tions used in Studies 1 and 2.
The other team was displayed in a series of video sequences (size:
480×853) embedded in the online survey and recorded with a webcam
(Microsoft Lifecam HD-3000; frame rate: 29 frames/s). As in Study 1, the
sequences represented a female actor, sitting in front of a computer with
three other persons standing behind her. After watching the first video
sequence, in which the outgroup representative greeted the participant,
subjects answered three screening questions testing their understanding
of the possible outcomes. The rest of the questionnaire was only pre-
sented to participants who correctly answered all three questions.10
Subjects were asked to imagine a situation in which they had sent 7 of
their 10 tickets to the other team. They then saw the second video se-
quence in which the outgroup representative turned to consult with her
team. Next, they were told that the other group had decided not to return
any tickets, resulting in the participant's group finishing the round with 3
tickets, compared with the other group's 31 tickets. Participants then
saw, in random order, the video sequences showing regretful, happy, and
neutral expressions of the outgroup representative, and were asked to
imagine that each video depicted how the representative and her team
felt about the decision they had made. The sequences were similar to
those used in Study 1 and were validated in a pilot study (see Supple-
mental Materials, S4 for a detailed description and https://osf.io/
h7av3/?view_only=64a45a1b7def4d95b1231e35df6a2c78 for the
video files). Fig. 4 shows still images from the three emotion videos.
After each video, participants were asked to imagine a situation in
which they played the same game with another member of the same
outgroup and were asked to decide how many lottery tickets (out of 10)
they wished to send to this person. We also asked about subjects' ex-
pectations of the number of tickets that this person would return after
receiving 5 tickets (and therefore having 25 tickets to share after this
allocation was tripled). Finally, participants used 7-point scales to rate
how positive the outgroup representative had felt about the number of
tickets her team gained and how much she would like to change her
decision, if she had the chance to do so (see https://osf.io/h7av3/?
view_only=64a45a1b7def4d95b1231e35df6a2c78 for the full ques-
tionnaire). After seeing the videos and answering the corresponding
questions, participants were thanked and paid for completing the study.
4.2. Results
4.2.1. Manipulation check
The ratings of how positive the representative felt about the number
of tickets her team sent varied significantly as a function of Emotion, F
(2, 82)= 102.43, p < .001, ηp2= 0.71. Pairwise comparisons revealed
that the outgroup representative was perceived as significantly more
positive when she smiled (M=6.38, SD=0.88) than when she
adopted the neutral facial expression (M=3.55, SD=1.15, p < .001,
95% CI [2.55, 3.50]). The difference between the regret (M=3.36,
SD=1.30) and neutral conditions was not significant, p= .47, 95% CI
[−0.72, 0.33].
4.2.2. Willingness to change decision
Responses to the question about the extent to which the outgroup
representative would like to change her decision were also affected by
the facial expression she displayed, F(2, 82)= 18.88, p < .001,
ηp2= 0.31. Specifically, the regret expression elicited higher scores on
this measure (M=4.69, SD=1.69) than did the neutral facial ex-
pression (M=3.62, SD=1.39, p= .003, 95% CI [0.40, 1.75]). The
difference between the smile (M=2.48, SD=1.71) and the neutral
expression was also significant, p= .005, 95% CI [0.37, 1.91]. In sum,
while facial expressions of happiness elicited high ratings of positivity,
the expression of regret was associated with increased willingness to
change one's behavior.
4.2.3. Allocations
Participants' hypothetical allocations were significantly influenced
by Emotion, F(2, 82)= 5.52, p= .006, ηp2= 0.12 (see Fig. 5). Pairwise
comparisons revealed that participants were willing to send more
tickets after seeing the regret expression (M=3.19, SD=2.72) than
after seeing the neutral facial expression (M=2.31, SD=2.50),
p= .04, 95% CI [0.04, 1.72]. The difference between the neutral and
smile expressions (M=1.93, SD=2.15) was not significant, p= .28,
95% CI [−0.32, 1.09].
4.2.4. Expected outgroup allocations
Participants' expectations of how much the outgroup game partner
would return also varied significantly as a function of Emotion, F(2,
82)= 10.80, p < .001, ηp2= 0.21. Outgroup game partners were ex-
pected to send more tickets when the representative had expressed
regret (M=7.05, SD=5.55), compared to the neutral facial expression
(M=4.43, SD=4.65), p= .005, 95% CI [0.82, 4.42]. The difference
between the smile (M=3.17, SD=4.14) and the neutral facial ex-
pression was only marginally significant, p= .07, 95% CI [−0.10,
2.62].
Table 3 displays correlations between the key measures in the three
emotion conditions. As in Studies 1 and 2, there was a significant cor-
relation between participants' allocations and expectations of outgroup
behavior. Importantly, allocations were also significantly and positively
associated with participants' ratings of the representative's willingness
to change her behavior. This association was significant in the smile
and regret conditions, but not in the neutral condition.
4.3. Discussion
As in Study 1, regret and happiness were conveyed by dynamic
videos of facial expressions, but this time we compared the effects of the
two emotion displays with a neutral, baseline condition. This allows us
to conclude that the observed effects following a breach of trust are due
to regret enhancing intergroup trust, rather than smiles weakening in-
tergroup trust. Participants were also explicitly told that they were
playing the second round of the game with an outgroup member who
was not the outgroup representative seen in round 1. The fact that the
facial expressions of the group representative affected how participants
anticipated behaving towards a different group member confirms that
the effects of one outgroup member's emotional expressions generalize
to behavior towards other outgroup members.
A potential limitation of Study 3 is the use of a hypothetical, rather
than real, setting in a within-subjects study, with participants providing
their responses individually, rather than in small groups. It is possible
that these changes – which were motivated by feasibility constraints –
reduced the immersive character of the experiment, as well as the
(footnote continued)
discussed further.
10 All participants had been informed about the presence of screening ques-
tions in the survey before providing consent.
M. Rychlowska et al. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 82 (2019) 74–84
81
salience of the perceived intergroup context. On the other hand, this
conceptual replication of the findings of Studies 1 and 2 in a sample
derived from general population rather than undergraduate students
provides additional support for the prediction that emotional displays
of one individual affect trust towards the group to which this person
belongs.
The findings extend the results of Studies 1 and 2 to a new set of
stimuli: Once again, facial expressions of regret elicited higher levels of
trust than did smiling facial expressions, in terms of both allocations
and expectations of outgroup behavior. The findings also reveal that the
expression of regret conveys information about how likely the unfair
behavior is to recur in the future. Finally, the findings again suggest
that facial expressions of regret influence participants' economic deci-
sions more strongly than pictograms communicating generally negative
affect.
5. General discussion
In three experiments, we examined how expressions of regret affect
intergroup trust following unfair outgroup behavior. Findings revealed
greater trust towards an outgroup member when an unfair re-
presentative of the outgroup had expressed regret or unhappiness ra-
ther than happiness about their behavior, with regret expressions ex-
erting a more marked influence than expressions of general
unhappiness. Comparing regret and happiness with a neutral expression
in Study 3 revealed that the effects of emotion were driven by expres-
sions of regret increasing trust, rather than expressions of happiness
decreasing trust. As revealed in Study 3, expressions of regret com-
municated not only the representative's negative feelings about the
decision, but also a willingness to change behavior – an appraisal that
significantly predicted participants' own allocation decisions.
Our results extend the findings of Van der Schalk et al. (2015), who
used two interpersonal games to show that observing how another
person feels about fair and unfair behavior affects the observer's own
economic decisions. However, unlike Van der Schalk et al. (2015), we
focused on trust. This was motivated by the relevance of this construct
for cooperation, forgiveness, and successful intergroup exchanges (e.g.,
Serva, Fuller, & Mayer, 2005). In the present research, we used a var-
iation of the trust game to simulate a competitive intergroup setting in
which two groups communicate via representatives (Folmer et al.,
2017), and where one group behaves unfairly during an initial ex-
change, creating a breach of trust (Lount et al., 2008). The damaging
effect of such a breach was reflected in a substantial main effect of
outgroup behavior on subsequent trust in Studies 1 and 2. However, our
results show that facial expressions of regret, even when un-
accompanied by any verbal messages, are sufficiently powerful to en-
hance trust during subsequent interactions with other members of the
transgressing group. To our knowledge, this is the first time that such an
effect has been reported, although the finding dovetails well with pre-
vious results documenting the effects of emotions accompanying real-
world apologies (Ten Brinke & Adams, 2015).
In line with previous work, our studies support theoretical positions
arguing that expressions of regret, like other appeasement emotions
such as guilt or embarrassment, can serve as nonverbal apologies, sig-
naling a willingness to repair the relationship (Baumeister et al., 1994;
Feinberg et al., 2012; Schniter et al., 2015; Semin & Manstead, 1982).
Our studies are also in line with work that illustrates the relationship-
repairing potential of appeasement emotions in intergroup settings. For
example, by investigating the effects of emotions conveyed by the
outgroup, our experiments complement the findings of a recent study by
Shore, Rychlowska, Van der Schalk, Parkinson, and Manstead (2018)
exploring the effects of emotion expressions of the ingroup. In this
study, guilt – an appeasement emotion conceptually close to regret
(Baumeister et al., 1994) – expressed by an ingroup member who failed
to reciprocate a trusting move by the outgroup increased participants'
own feelings of guilt and their allocations in a subsequent round of a
trust game. Similarly, a recent study by Solak, Reifen Tagar, Cohen-
Chen, Saguy, and Halperin (2016) suggests that the influence of ap-
peasement emotions extends to the real-world settings of the 2014 war
in Gaza and racial tensions in the US. Given that feelings of regret, guilt,
or empathy do not typically occur spontaneously in a perpetrator
group, an important avenue for future research will be to investigate
the extent to which such emotions are elicited by other elements of the
context (Levy, van Zomeren, Saguy, & Halperin, 2017).
Interestingly, in the present research, emotions influenced partici-
pants' decisions in the unfair (competitive), but not in the fair (co-
operative) behavior conditions. This may be due to the norm of fairness
established by the confederate's initial trusting move (sending 7 tickets
out of 10) in the first round, and to the fact that the outgroup decision
Fig. 4. Emotion stimuli used in Study 3: expressions of regret, neutrality, and happiness displayed by the outgroup representative following an unfair decision.
Fig. 5. Study 3: participants' allocations in the trust game as a function of the
Emotion displayed by the outgroup representative after unfair behavior. Error
bars represent 95% confidence intervals. The asterisk indicates significance at
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not to return any tickets was an extreme breach of trust. Such a vio-
lation of the fairness norm might have induced a state of increased
vigilance and uncertainty in participants (Mendes, Blascovich, Hunter,
Lickel, & Jost, 2007), in which emotion information became particu-
larly relevant (Niedenthal, Mermillod, Maringer, & Hess, 2010). Con-
sistent with this line of reasoning, results of a recent study (Hoegen,
Stratou, & Gratch, 2017) showed that emotion expressions are not in-
formative during mutual cooperation but become especially relevant
for predicting people's decisions when players behave unfairly. While
the effects of appeasement displays are likely moderated by the extent
to which these expressions are spontaneous vs. strategic (Shore &
Parkinson, 2017), our research reveals that the reparatory effects of
regret extend to competitive contexts.
Our results also complement the findings of Van Kleef et al. (2006).
These researchers showed that seeing a negotiation opponent expres-
sing appeasement emotions – such as regret or guilt – increased parti-
cipants' expectations that the other would make concessions and as a
result increased the toughness of their own demands. Conversely, par-
ticipants who were exposed to emotions communicating dependency
and need for help, such as disappointment or worry, made greater
concessions. These opposing effects of different types of negative
emotions shed additional light on the small effect sizes observed in
Study 2, in which we manipulated unhappiness – a non-specific nega-
tive emotion, potentially conveying elements of both appeasement and
need for help.
It should be acknowledged that the interaction between outgroup
behavior and outgroup emotion was not significant in Study 2, and that
the planned comparison between the two fair conditions was only
marginally significant. While the pattern of results in Study 2 echoed
the one observed in the two other studies, we interpret the weaker ef-
fects of emotion on participants' allocations in Study 2 as reflecting the
lack of specificity of the emotion manipulation: Whereas in Studies 1
and 3 the outgroup team used facial expressions to convey regret and
readiness to change one's behavior, in Study 2 the outgroup team ex-
pressed general negative affect which presumably conveyed less in-
formation about how they appraised their past decision and about their
future intentions. We therefore argue that the lack of statistical sig-
nificance of the results in Study 2 shows that our findings are specific to
expressions of regret, rather than general negative affect. This inter-
pretation is supported by the significant positive correlation, observed
in Study 3, between participants' allocations and their judgments of the
outgroup representative's willingness to change her decision observed
in the emotion conditions of Study 3. It is also possible that the videos
in which participants could see the facial expressions of the outgroup
representative were more compelling than the text-and-pictogram de-
scriptions used in Study 2. People are known to be more sensitive to
changes in faces than to changes in other objects, given the unique
biological significance of faces (Ro, Russell, & Lavie, 2001), which
would also help to account for the more powerful effects observed in
the two studies using video stimuli.
Another potential limitation of the current research is that the ef-
fects for the comparisons of interest between regret (or unhappiness)
and happiness following unfair outgroup behavior were relatively small
in size (d=0.33, Study 1; d=0.24, Study 2, and d=0.51, Study 3),
such that on average participants sent approximately one additional
ticket more to members of an outgroup that had expressed regret than
to members of an outgroup that had expressed happiness. At first
glance, this may not seem impressive, especially compared with the
substantial effect of outgroup behavior (d=1.56, Study 1; d=0.98,
Study 2), where the difference in allocations to the fair versus unfair
teams was around two (Study 2) or nearly three (Study 1) tickets.
However, it is worth keeping in mind the fact that the trust violation
occurred in an intergroup setting with a representative – where trust
restoration is challenging (Folmer et al., 2017) – and was serious in
nature: After the ingroup's initial trusting move, the outgroup failed to
return any tickets and thereby showed itself to be untrustworthy. The
fact that expressions of emotion are powerful enough to enhance trust
after such a serious transgression demonstrates their potential for im-
proving intergroup relations. In real-world contexts, where emotions
are likely to have a similar influence (Ten Brinke & Adams, 2015), even
small improvements in intergroup trust may translate into savings of
millions of dollars, tons of carbon dioxide, or many thousands of lives.
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